“THE JUDICIAL INSTITUTION AS A SYMBOLIC SYSTEM” by Lucien, Arnaud
”THE JUDICIAL INSTITUTION AS A SYMBOLIC
SYSTEM”
Arnaud Lucien
To cite this version:
Arnaud Lucien. ”THE JUDICIAL INSTITUTION AS A SYMBOLIC SYSTEM”. 18TH
BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE 2007 Judges and judging, Jul 2007, Oxford
UK, Four courts press (Dublin Ireland), 2007. <sic 00161483>
HAL Id: sic 00161483
https://archivesic.ccsd.cnrs.fr/sic 00161483
Submitted on 10 Jul 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
18TH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE 2007 
Judges and judging 
 
2 - 5 July 2007 St Catherine’s College 
Organised by Oxford Law Faculty 
 
 
“THE JUDICIAL INSTITUTION AS A SYMBOLIC SYSTEM” 
 
 
Arnaud LUCIEN 
Part time lecturer - PHD candidate 
Laboratoire Information Milieux Médias, Médiations EA 3820 
Université du Sud Toulon Var 
BP 20 132 – 83 957 La Garde cedex 
arnaud.lucien@univ-tln.fr 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
Lawsuits, and from a general point of view the act of judging, are fascinating phenomena’s. 
Justice can often be found at the core of our passions as a sacred and ritual activity. As well 
as death rituals, judicial rituals are to be found in every organised society sharing links with 
the divine or sacred things. This deep rooted sacred element ensures the authority of the 
judicial institution and of its discourse. The judge represents God and is the only one to 
possess the power to announce the truth. The passage from tradition to modernity and post 
modernity characterized by the dominance of the principle of reason may weaken the 
discourse of the judicial institution. Because of its rationalization, it is now competing against 
other kinds of discourse and especially those of politicians. Just like other social institutions, 
the judicial institution is particularly confronted with the post modern problems of the meaning 
and representation. 
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 Lawsuits, and from a general point of view 
the act of judging, are fascinating 
phenomena’s. Justice can often be found 
at the core of our passions as a sacred 
and ritual activity. As well as death rituals, 
judicial rituals are to be found in every 
organised society sharing links with the 
divine or sacred things. This deep rooted 
sacred element ensures the authority of 
the judicial institution and of its discourse, 
the judge representing God and being the 
only one to possess the power to 
announce the truth. The passage from 
tradition to modernity and post modernity 
characterized by the dominance of the 
principle of reason may weaken the 
discourse of the judicial institution. 
Because of its rationalization it is now 
competing against other kinds of discourse 
and especially those of politicians. Just 
like other social institutions, the judicial 
institution is particularly confronted with 
the post modern problems of the meaning 
and representation. The institutions are 
disillusioned. The symbols of the past are 
losing their meaning. This emancipation 
from “reli–gion” could be emancipation 
from what links, which would represent a 
weakening of social ties and lead on 
society to anomia. The judicial institution 
will be considered herewith as a symbolic 
way to represent the community as it 
contributes to create  a discourse on truth 
while it used to find its authority in sacred 
things and in the resort to a kind of 
religious dogma, it now seems to be 
roating itself into a new dogma based on 
the “social contract”. Although the French 
revolution moved the place where the 
dogma is asserted, and the state 
represents the absolute spirit that yields 
bad to reason… the King survives 
nonetheless through the role of president 
of the state and the judicial institution 
remains based on the idea of symbolic 
representation without insisting structurally 
on a real democratic vacation. This logic 
based on representation always allows to 
get “the invisible parts out of a body” 
(Merleau Ponty -1960). The judicial 
institution as an area of representation 
thus grants society, as a social body, the 
ability to complete itself thanks to the 
outside… The mirror of social 
representation drags out the invisible parts 
of the social body which can position itself 
in this area of representation. The judicial 
mirror allows society to become both stage 
and discourse (Legendre, 1999). From 
that prospective, the judicial institution 
appears in a compound relationship 
through the role played by the judge as a 
mediate between the individual and the 
community, as a reality which is not 
immediately accessible but which can be 
accessed “mediatly”, it is used for this 
purpose (pierce, 1970) This prerogative of 
representation gives authority and 
legitimacy to the judge as a consequence 
of an accepted dogma. This right to act “in 
the stead of” doesn’t imply supervision but 
independence on the contrary: it 
accomplishes what the community can’t do 
by itself. Therefore the judicial institution 
conveys the message of a certain 
community as well as its own message 
which is linked to the culture of the 
community and its organization. According 
to what Pierre Legendre said (1985 p. 
185): “The judicial authorities are in an 
institutional position of third party, with all it 
implies in relation to the general economy 
of reference in a society and for every 
individual” Solving a conflict between 
private interests takes a collective 
dimension if efficient decisions are made 
for the parties involved and if more 
symbolic ones are also made for society. 
With the desincarnation of parties and 
facts into a juridical qualification, a lawsuit 
becomes an arbitration of values and 
acquires a symbolic dimension concerning 
society. The judicial institution has for 
objective the preservation of the meaning 
of Reference. In this objective which 
consists in preserving Reference, lawsuits 
appear as representations of a struggle 
between values and proscription, under 
the control of the instituted authorities. 
When legal proceedings begin, parties are 
disincarnated and facts are disqualified in 
order to display their representative role. 
The judicial ceremony then takes up a new 
meaning as a theatrical representation of 
concepts which are materialised by judicial 
struggles. The dramatization is not 
unrelated to the importance of proscription 
in an organized society. Judicial decisions 
replace divine sentences but keep the 
same values which are universal and 
whose logic is guided by the Reference. 
The judicial system therefore conveys a 
message which is always based on a 
“dogma”. All the elements of the system 
contribute to the elaboration of this 
discourse. All the rituals, the symbols, the 
suits, architecture as a symbolic system… 
We will then analyse the judicial institution 
with a semiotical approach as a system of 
representation which stages the values 
and proscriptions of society (I) and also as 
a system which transmits meaning and 
values (II). 
 
PART 1. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A SYSTEM 
OF REPRESENTATION. 
 
The purpose of the judicial institution is not 
limited to the preservation of public order, 
it is also meant to preserve the meaning of 
Reference. As an authority which used to 
be legitimate thanks to the dogma found in 
sacred writings and has been so through 
the dogma of the “social contract” since 
Enlightment, the judicial institution is 
among the system having the power to 
proscribe any offence against the symbolic 
order. According to Pierre Legendre 
(1983, p.51) “The dogmatic function in a 
society consists in founding and staging 
the biological function of reproduction. It is 
about supporting the human cause with 
the use of institutions by finding meaning 
to life and death”. The dramatization of the 
judicial struggle takes its full meaning: a 
meaning of collective vocation. The judicial 
“staging” organizes the representation of 
value struggles and cultural proscriptions 
to the community; lawsuits are the 
technical “stagings” of the third party’s 
discourse in an effective way for the 
defendant and a significant one for 
society. Indeed the real objective of 
representation is to put to light what can 
not be put to light by itself. Paradoxically, it 
entails an impossibility to appear 
immediately which however is likely to be 
overcome by the mediation of the staging. 
This representation is imposed by the 
impossibility of immediacy; a deficiency of 
the represented and then “implies a 
system of echoes between the absentee 
and the present, the obscure and the 
clear, the close and the far” Laupiès, p.22, 
2001).Past facts are represented by 
lawsuits, as well as the struggle between 
values and the affirmation of proscription. 
Individuals are neglected to the benefit of 
symbolic garments. Facts are not 
personalized and as a result they can 
receive a juridical qualification. The parties 
then incarnate juridical qualifiers and 
become nothing more than the symbols of 
what isn’t there and what can’t be there: 
what society approves and disapproves of. 
The individual becomes “accused”, 
“implicated”, “plaintiff”, “defendant”, 
“victim”, “criminal”… but is not an 
individual to justice anymore. The facts 
find their juridical qualification; “crime”, 
“fine”, “contract”… thanks to the mediation 
of law, facts are requalified and parties are 
disincarnated. Individualities are put aside 
in a certain limit depending on the principle 
of what is call in France “personnalité des 
peines”, and an increasing 
individualization since it is associated in 
the proximity. Judges occupy a central 
position, they represent the third party. 
The authority and the power of the 
community that are give to them due to the 
authorization they obtain from the state. 
This position is accompanied by signs of 
this authority whose origins are dogmatic. 
The signs of this authority are to be found 
in sacred things. The judicial compound 
itself, owes a lot to its sacred heritage. 
According to Jean Carbonnier (2000) “any 
hearing place in archaic societies is 
isolated from the ordinary world”. Thus, the 
judicial area is symmetrical according to 
an axis defined by the position of the 
president and clearly reminds of the trinity. 
In the Christian symbolic order, that is 
where the mystery is set. (Feuillet 2004). 
The president is the farthest from the 
entrance in order to show its distance with 
the secular world. The actors then take 
their part in this real ceremony. The 
duration of the hearing is sacred time. The 
ritual has a strict rhythm: the hearing starts 
with the entrance of the president, a highly 
symbolic moment when justice settles in 
and which follows the bailiffs calling out 
“the court”. The audience defendant, 
lawyers rise up in sign of respect as 
chatter and talks become silence. 
Until the court leaves; the audience is 
directed by the judge, and within judicial 
compound, we can readily differentiate the 
profane from the men of law who are lost 
in a universe both impressive and 
impossible to understand. This element of 
holiness that we can find in most of the 
institutions of the republic allows us to 
support this idea that revolutionary 
antidogmatism was in fact the rise of a 
new dogma based on a social contract 
and in which the state and reason 
replaced the sacred. 
Thus, even if its vocation is not to 
represent any divine justice, the judicial 
institution never completely separated 
itself from its sacred origins. The whole 
judiciary stage then becomes a symbolic 
representation. The judge represents the 
Republic, whereas he used to represent 
God or the King in earlier times, and all 
men of law are integrated into this judicial 
system. Lawsuits are only the struggle 
between representations. That is to say 
the representation of reality based on 
different perceptions but also the 
representation of proscription regarding 
the community. 
By the use of “distorting mirrors”, the 
judicial representation stages values, 
proscriptions, and becomes the media of a 
new message from the community. By 
taking a collective dimension and setting 
into a temporal dimension, the conflict 
becomes a source of fulfilment for society 
(Simmel, 1995) through the evolution and 
adaptation of case law. The conflict 
doesn’t unilaterally have a pernicious or 
disastrous role but it is ambivalent. It is 
then the role of the judicial institution to 
position itself as a mediator and to enable 
society to improve thanks to the conflict 
and thanks to its mediation to the benefit 
of the community and the meaning of 
Reference. This general answer given to 
litigation therefore is the only acceptable 
one; it shall consequently have a collective 
impact. 
Law ruling has two values, a practical one 
which is worthy for its application to the 
parties related to a litigation and a 
collective value in an assertion of values 
or an arbitration between these values. 
The judge holds a position of special 
importance as a third party in the conflict 
of private interest and as a legitimate 
authority representing their republic. 
All decisions of justice are given in the 
name of the people and bear a collective 
message which transcends the facts. The 
judicial decision making process translates 
the collective vocation of judicial message. 
The rulings of the Supreme Court “Cour de 
cassation” are sometimes used to recall or 
assert a rule and convey a message which 
shall outweigh the importance of a 
decision in the consequences it has upon 
the parties. Some decisions sometimes 
seem to be distant from the original 
litigation so as to reassert the values and 
principles of the community. 
For example, the condemnation of old 
people accused of crime against humanity 
has for only useful purpose the 
remembrance of some values. In other 
cases, the judge has the possibility to 
acknowledge the guilt of a defendant while 
exempting him from a sentence; those are 
the effects of the individualization of 
sentences which allow “justice” to convey 
a clear message about the respect of 
values as well as reducing the decision 
whose consequences would have been 
unfair. 
 
PART II. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM; 
DISPOSITIVE OF TRANSMISSION. 
 
The judicial system as a system of 
representation following the meaning 
given to it by Regis Debray, is a system 
which expounds the dogma through time. 
The transmission is spread like a 
communication, a sharing of meanings, 
values and knowledge between different 
spatiotemporal spheres optimized by an 
individual and collective body which is 
integrated into the collective memory. The 
judicial system transmits its values and 
knowledge in an enduring way through 
privileged venues (courthouses, hearing 
rooms…), rites (the hearing process), 
pieces of clothing (Lawyer, magistrates 
robes) a language, and a culture. As a 
consequence, the judicial institution, 
transmits because its functioning includes 
“beyond and below word, a lot of other 
sources of meaning: gestures, places as 
well as words and pictures, ceremonies as 
well as intellectual and moral ones” 
(Debray, page 9, 2000). Imagining places 
of identification, the courthouse, the 
hearing room represent  the institution and 
its values. The study of the symbols and 
the architecture strongly evoke the 
transmissions operated by the judicial 
institution itself. Symbols have two roles: 
to contain and unveil; their role is not to 
show or make some kind of stylization of 
judicial ideas; they are signs of 
permanence they resist without words, 
where verbalization could concept 
enduring universal ideas. “They have to be 
there and talk to everybody, to initiated 
people as well as secular people in a vital 
communion for the reinforcement of 
collective values” (Ferreira Da Cunha, 
1995, p. 106) while language is perverted 
by time because of inevitable variations of 
meaning symbols curved in stone or metal 
keep the authenticity of a message. 
However, symbols can suffer differences 
in aesthetic interpretation when they are 
work of art. Nonetheless, the judicial 
system follows this interpretation in as 
much as it brings together a multiplicity of 
signs whose meaning is close. By the way, 
the several representations of the judicial 
institution which are to be found in 
literature (Malaurie, 1997), Show that 
there is a uniform interpretation of the 
meaning of the signs of the organization; 
For example, the allegory of “justice” 
represented by a blindfolded antique 
goddess who holds a sword and scales, 
almost unanimely possess the symbols 
and the qualities of sovereign power. The 
scales evoke judgment and equality for 
most civilizations, as well as the blindfold 
represents impartiality and the sword 
means both truth and strength. 
Courthouses then find their solemnity in 
the adoption of an architectural paradigm 
which is an inspiration found in Corinthian 
temples. This kind of architecture 
translates best the ideas of stability, 
strength, permanence, and sobriety that 
the judicial institution advocates. The 
choice of noble and unalterable materials 
belongs to this search for inviolability. The 
edification of courthouses didn’t obey 
utilitarian restrictions but was prescribed 
by magistrates themselves. A true judiciary 
aesthetic trend appeared during the 
classic age, at first to separate “justice” 
from “justiciables” for the people can be 
brought to count justice referring to divine 
intervention, it needed to get as far as 
possible from “justicables”. Court houses 
were then surrounded or even isolated 
within cities by public places, thus avoiding 
the proximity of businesses… Temple 
inspires fear and hold people back. In the 
19th century, these buildings made a 
massive entrance into cities. Their 
objective is not to settle conflicts anymore 
but to impose fear and respect of justice in 
an enduring “architectural language” 
“Everything that seeks prestige and 
authority needs grandeur: we feel like the 
“justiciables” of a more imposing justice 
and this way, architecture brings its  
essential element which is necessary for 
the respectability of judged things” 
(Leniaud quoting Julien, p. 18) The 
example of Roman basilicas with their 
flights of stains, columns and fundaments 
eventually imposed itself to incorporate the 
seriousness of law and the solemnity of 
justice. Nowadays, the construction and 
modernization of courthouses obey to 
functional requirements to the detriment of 
symbols and of enduring things. 
Nowadays, proximity is considered a 
quality. All public policies tend to add more 
proximity even as far as hinting at a return 
to formerly declining occupations. Cabinet 
hearings multiply where magistrates and 
lawyers don’t wear their robes and where 
every symbolic distance is erased. 
Kafka’s expression considering judges as 
the “small civil servants of justice” will soon 
lose its derogatory value. A decline of 
symbolization cankers the judicial 
institution which is going through both a 
structural and communicational crisis. 
This crisis is not different from a post 
modern crisis which leads to subornation 
of enduring things to more ephemeral 
ones and is accompanied by a loss of 
legitimacy of the figures representing 
authority: that is to say, in education, 
politics, medical sciences. 
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